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The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) recently 
proposed increasing the fuel economy of new light trucks by 1.5 miles per gallon for 
vehicles produced in model year 2007.  NHTSA’s analysis of its proposal implausibly 
concludes that the benefits to consumers are more than twice the costs to manufacturers, 
ignoring effects on the environment or dependence on foreign oil.   
 
NHTSA’s proposal has several serious flaws.  It wrongly presumes that 
manufacturers cannot produce items that consumers are willing to buy, even though they 
could make money by doing so.  Its analysis uses overly optimistic measures of net 
benefits.  In addition, NHTSA neglects the adverse effects from the increased driving 
induced by the proposal.  By lowering the cost of driving, NHTSA’s proposal increases 
vehicle miles traveled, thereby boosting traffic accidents and congestion.  The increase in 
the costs of accidents and congestion fully offsets and probably outweighs the social 
benefits resulting from greater fuel economy.   
 
If NHTSA is interested in a cost-effective way of reducing gasoline use, it should 
consider giving consumers better information about fuel economy of new vehicles, or 
suggest a modest gasoline tax.  A penny per gallon levy would conserve more fuel in 
2007 than NHTSA’s proposal, while lowering, rather than increasing, traffic congestion 
and accidents.  
Do Regulations Requiring Light Trucks To Be More Fuel Efficient  
Make Economic Sense? 
An Evaluation of NHTSA’s Proposed Standards 
 
Randall Lutter and Troy Kravitz 
 
Introduction 
The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) recently 
proposed more stringent fuel efficiency standards for light trucks—the minivans, sports 
utility vehicles, and pickup trucks that now make up about half of the new vehicle 
market.  In its proposal to increase the fuel economy of new light trucks by 1.5 miles per 
gallon by 2007, NHTSA tentatively concludes such a standard is “within the 
technological feasibility and economic practicability of the primary contributors to the 
light truck market, is capable of being met without substantial product restrictions, 
vehicle weight reductions or adverse effects on air quality, and will enhance the ability of 
the nation to conserve fuel consumption and reduce its dependence on foreign oil.”
1  To 
justify its proposal, NHTSA presents estimates that the proposed rule would cost 
manufacturers $370 million for vehicles produced in model year 2007 while saving 
consumers $790 million in fuel costs.
2  In fact, NHTSA’s proposed rule is likely to 
impose significant costs on vehicle manufacturers and buyers without bringing net 
benefits to society at large.  
NHTSA’s justification for its proposal has three key deficiencies.  First, NHTSA 
implausibly concludes that the benefits to consumers from more fuel-efficient vehicles 
are twice the costs to producers, even before estimating any effects on the environment or 
energy dependence.  This conclusion is a red flag event for economists:  It implies that 
                                                           
1 See U.S. Department of Transportation (2002c, p. 77019). 
2 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Executive Summary).                     2 
manufacturers cannot produce items that consumers are willing and able to buy, even 
though they could make money by doing so!  If true, it means that NHTSA should prefer 
better labeling and information disclosure instead of mandatory new fuel economy 
standards.   
Second, NHTSA’s analysis inappropriately overstates net benefits.  It ignores the 
value to consumers of reduced performance associated with better fuel economy.  It 
assumes consumers can finance new vehicle purchases at interest rates lower than those 
available in the market.  In addition, it entirely neglects the increased risk of highway 
fatalities that would ensue from reductions in vehicle weight.    
Third, and most importantly, NHTSA ignores the adverse effects of the increased 
driving that will result from mandating more fuel-efficient vehicles.  The greater fuel 
efficiency will increase driving by reducing its cost, and additional driving will contribute 
to additional risk of traffic accidents and greater traffic congestion.  These two adverse 
effects fully offset and probably outweigh the social value of reduced gasoline 
consumption.
3   
  NHTSA has authority – and an obligation – to consider the full economic 
implications of alternative standards.  Congress has directed the Secretary of 
Transportation to set fuel economy standards that are “the maximum feasible average fuel 
economy level that the Secretary decides the manufacturers can achieve in [a] model 
year.”
4  But NHTSA, in view of the legislative history, has interpreted its mandate to 
mean it must consider manufacturers’ “asserted capabilities, product plans and economic 
conditions against their projected capabilities, the need for the nation to conserve energy 
                                                           
3 Emission of nitrogen oxides, which the Environmental Protection Agency regulates on a per-mile basis, 
would also rise as a result of increased vehicle use, but this effect is too small to matter for our analysis.                      3 
and the effect of other regulations (including motor vehicle safety and emissions 
regulations) and other public policy objectives.”
5  Thus, NHTSA sets corporate average 
fuel economy (CAFE) standards at the “maximum feasible level” based upon “technical 
feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of government motor vehicle standards on 
fuel economy and the need of the U.S. to conserve energy.”
6 
  To the extent that NHTSA has discretion under this legal standard, it has to adopt 
the least burdensome regulation consistent with meeting its regulatory objectives and 
must design regulations in the most cost-effective manner, according to President 
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review – which is still in 
force.
7  Yet our economic analysis indicates that NHTSA’s proposed new fuel economy 
standard is unnecessarily burdensome and far from cost-effective. 
To reduce gasoline consumption in the U.S. cost-effectively, NHTSA should 
pursue the plain implication of its own analysis and consider improved fuel economy 
labels on light trucks for sale.  If it seeks greater cuts in gas consumption, NHTSA should 
ask Congress to raise taxes on gasoline.
8  Taxes would be more cost-effective than more 
stringent CAFE standards because they would decrease traffic accidents and congestion, 
while more stringent CAFE would raise them.  
After describing the existing program regulating fuel efficiency standards, we 
describe three problems with NHTSA’s economic analysis.  We show that mandatory 
standards will not benefit consumers, we then demonstrate that NHTSA’s analysis 
overstates net benefits, and finally we show that the unintended adverse effects of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 See 49 United States Code 32902. 
5 See U.S. Department of Transportation (2002c, p. 77019).   
6 See Department of Transportation (2002b, Abstract).  
7 See Clinton (1993).                     4 
additional driving will fully outweigh and probably exceed the social benefit of reduced 
fuel consumption. We conclude with some policy recommendations.   
Background 
After the Arab oil embargo of 1973 caused a sharp increase in the price of oil, the 
federal government – in 1975 – began mandating minimum levels of fuel efficiency for 
new motor vehicles.
9  It set CAFE standards for light trucks (pickups, vans and sport 
utility vehicles with gross vehicle weight ratings of 8,500 pounds or less) of 17.2 miles 
per gallon (mpg) for model year (MY) 1979.  Over time the standards have slowly 
increased, with the current level for light trucks of 20.7 mpg in place since MY 1996.
10   
Different CAFE standards for light trucks and passenger cars have been 
responsible for important changes in the vehicle fleet over the years.  Minivans and sport-
utility vehicles (SUVs) have become more popular partly because they are subject to the 
light truck standard, which is significantly less stringent than the one applied to passenger 
cars: 20.7 instead of 27.5 mpg.
11  In 1999 light trucks constituted approximately 48 
percent of new vehicle sales,
12 and in 2000 light trucks were estimated to be 45 percent of 
the vehicle fleet.
13  Manufacturers have virtually discontinued making traditional big 
station wagons in part because they are classified as passenger cars subject to the higher 
standard.  
During the 1990s, Congress prevented NHTSA from issuing more stringent 
CAFE standards.  Through a rider to the Department of Transportation’s annual 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 See Appendix A for a comparison of taxes and CAFE standards.  An increase in gasoline taxes need not 
increase the size of government if coupled with decreases in other taxes.  
9 Firms that did not comply paid a fine. In years 1983-1998 these fines amounted to roughly $475 million.  
See Congressional Research Service (CRS) (2002a, pp. CRS-2).   
10 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section I). 
11 See CRS (2002a, Summary).  
12 See CRS (2002b, pp. CRS-2).                      5 
appropriations bill for fiscal year 1996, Congress stipulated that funds could not be spent 
for preparing, proposing, or promulgating any increased CAFE standards.
14  In legislation 
for fiscal year 2001, Congress requested that the National Academy of Sciences and the 
Department of Transportation examine the effectiveness of CAFE standards.
15   
NHTSA has developed a proposed new CAFE standard for light trucks increasing 
gradually to 22.2 mpg for MY 2007 using data from the NRC and vehicle 
manufacturers.
16  While an increase of 1.5 mpg from the current standard does not seem 
large, the CAFE standard has risen so much so fast only once—for MY 1983, when a 
long period of high gasoline prices sustained consumers’ interest in more fuel efficient 
vehicles.
17  
  Despite fairly broad academic criticism of CAFE standards,
18 lawmakers have 
supported CAFE as a politically attractive means to limit U.S. dependence on foreign oil, 
to conserve fuel, and increasingly, to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse 
gas.  Senators Feinstein (D-CA) and Snowe (R-ME) recently proposed requiring light-
duty trucks to meet the same fuel economy standards as passenger cars by 2011: 27.5 
mpg.
19  This latest proposal is similar to legislation introduced by Sens. Kerry (D-MA), 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 See CRS (2002a, pp. CRS-7). 
14 See Department of Transportation (1995, Section 330).  
15 See National Academy of Sciences (2002, p. 1).  The National Research Council (NRC) examined the 
effectiveness and impact of CAFE standards for the National Academy of Sciences (NAS).  See NAS 
(2002, Executive Summary). 
16 The estimated laboratory fleet averages under the two alternatives exceed the baselines since some 
manufacturers’ plans for future models already exceed both 20.7 and 22.2 mpg.  The estimated laboratory 
baseline with a 20.7 mpg minimum is 21.83 mpg for MY 2007; the estimated laboratory level after the 
proposed minimum of 22.2 mpg is 22.35 mpg for MY 2007.  See Department of Transportation (2002a, 
Executive Summary).  On-road fuel economy is assumed to be 85 percent of the laboratory test level.  See 
Department of Transportation (2002b, Appendix A).  
17 The current high prices in the U.S. are expected to fall to long-term average levels when tension in the 
Persian Gulf and Venezuela subside.   
18 See, for example, Crandall and Graham (1989), Coate and VanDerHoff (2001), Dunham (1997), Kleit 
(2002), and Winston and Shirley (1998).   
19 See Washington Post (2003).                       6 
Hollings (D-SC) and McCain (R-AZ) less than a year ago.  The Kerry-Hollings-McCain 
bill sought to increase the CAFE standard to 36 mpg by 2015 for most passenger 
vehicles, including light-duty trucks.
20  While the NHTSA proposed rule is less stringent, 
requiring 22.2 mpg by 2007, it is silent about what CAFE standard will be required in 
subsequent years.   
Economic Analysis  
  We describe in turn three problems with NHTSA’s proposal.  
1.  Mandatory fuel economy standards cannot benefit informed consumers. 
A threshold question is whether more stringent regulations can offer net benefits 
to consumers, ignoring any environmental or energy security concerns.  According to the 
Preliminary Economic Assessment of NHTSA, “The benefits [of improved fuel 
economy] are determined mainly from fuel savings over the lifetime of the vehicle.”
21  In 
particular, NHTSA estimated that the benefits are $794 million for model year 2007 
while the costs to vehicle manufacturers are only $373 million.
22  By themselves, these 
estimates imply there is a fundamental shortcoming—a failure—in the motor vehicle 
market, because these net benefits occur even in the absence of any environmental effects 
or dependence on foreign oil.  
The only plausible cause of the market failure implied by NHTSA’s analysis is 
inadequate consumer information about vehicle quality, and, in particular, the value of 
                                                           
20 See Holly  (2002).   
21 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Executive Summary).   
22 Using the data contained in the Preliminary Economic Assessment, we were unable to exactly reproduce 
NHTSA’s calculations.  We assumed that NHTSA employed a rebound effect of -.15 and on-road fuel 
economy 15 percent below fuel economy measured in laboratory tests.  Under these assumptions, we were 
able to replicate NHTSA’s analysis to within 2 percent.  See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section 
VII).                     7 
fuel economy.
23  Although NHTSA cites “the difficulty and time involved in calculating 
the total savings associated with purchasing a more fuel-efficient vehicle”
24 as a possible 
reason why consumers have not demanded greater fuel efficiency, such difficulties are 
insufficient to cause a market failure from inadequate information.  Consumers are 
already well informed about the costs of fueling new vehicles.  All new vehicles must 
display federally mandated stickers with government estimates of city and highway miles 
per gallon on their windows.
25  Furthermore, these stickers, as illustrated in Appendix B, 
already provide estimates of the annual fuel costs, so that differences in fuel costs among 
different vehicles can be easily compared with differences in loan payments.  The stickers 
even recommend comparing the fuel economy and fuel cost of different vehicles in the 
“FREE FUEL ECONOMY GUIDE available at the dealer.”
26 
Moreover, there is little reason to believe that consumers systematically 
underestimate the price of gasoline.  Consumers are likely to know the price of gas better 
than the price of, say, eggs, milk or other commodities.  Among consumer products 
bought on a weekly basis, only gasoline is advertised on big street signs.  This practice 
has arisen because drivers can fill up at one gas station pretty much as easily as at another 
and because drivers choose gas stations largely on the basis of price.  Gasoline of a given 
octane is a homogeneous commodity sold by specialized retail outlets that do not bundle 
it with other goods.  As a result, the returns to advertising are relatively large and service 
stations post prices prominently. 
                                                           
23 See, for example, OMB (2003) and OMB (1996, Section I.A) for explanations of market failure.  The 
other types of market failure (monopoly and externalities) are inapplicable.  
24 See Department of Transportation (2002c, p. 77023).  
25 See 40 CFR § 600.306-86. 
26 See Appendix B.                     8 
In addition, spending on gasoline is large enough to get the full attention of 
consumers when they buy new vehicles. The average household spent $1,055 on gasoline 
and motor oil in 1999, when gasoline prices were relatively low.
27  This figure represents 
nearly 3 percent of total out-of-pocket expenditures ($37,027), an amount roughly 
comparable to total spending on meat, fish, poultry, eggs and dairy products combined, 
which was $1,071.
28  Yet gasoline is different than these items.  If the price of beef or 
turkey or salmon rises, consumers can switch to pork, chicken, catfish, or even beans to 
avoid bearing the full burden of the higher prices.  On the other hand, to avoid higher 
gasoline prices, consumers must curtail car trips, use public transit, or join carpools, all of 
which are inconvenient or time-consuming options.  Thus, consumers can shift to less 
expensive alternatives to gasoline only with considerable difficulty.  As a result, they 
have additional incentives to buy fuel-efficient cars if they are at all concerned about 
minimizing unnecessary spending.  
NHTSA effectively concludes that a market failure exists without direct evidence 
or other information of such a failure.  Although economists have long recognized the 
possibility that markets fail because of inadequate information about the attributes of 
products,
29 NHTSA cites no surveys indicating that consumers fail to understand the 
implications of greater fuel economy for lifetime operating costs.  Moreover, NHTSA 
ignores the considerable indirect evidence summarized above that no such failure exists.   
If, contrary to the preceding empirical evidence, consumers were in fact ignorant 
about the fuel economy of vehicles they are considering purchasing, then the appropriate 
policy response would not be to mandate greater fuel economy, but, rather, to supply 
                                                           
27 See U.S. Census Bureau (2001, No. 659). 
28 See U.S. Census Bureau (2001, No. 659).                     9 
consumers with the information they lack.  New guidance on economic analysis recently 
proposed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) makes this point.  It states, 
“If intervention is contemplated to address a market failure that arises from inadequate or 
asymmetric information, informational remedies will often be the preferred approach.”
30  
The guidance document goes on to explain, “A regulatory measure to improve the 
availability of information (particularly about the concealed characteristics of products) 
provides consumers a greater choice than a mandatory product standard or ban.”
31  In 
essence, mandatory standards deny consumers access to vehicles they would prefer to 
buy.  The superiority of providing information, instead of mandating standards has been 
broadly accepted for years.  For example, in 1996 OMB advised, “If intervention is 
necessary to address a market failure arising from inadequate or asymmetric information, 
informational remedies will often be the preferred approaches.”
32  It then elaborated, “As 
an alternative to a mandatory product standard or ban, a regulatory measure to improve 
the availability of information (particularly about the concealed characteristics of 
products) gives consumers a greater choice.”
33  Thus, a plain reading of NHTSA’s own 
evidence about the costs and benefits of more stringent CAFE standards – if it were 
adequately supported by facts – would point to a regulatory approach very different from 
its proposed mandatory standards.  NHTSA should follow the implications of its own 
economic analysis and consider measures to improve consumer information, instead of 
mandating new fuel economy standards.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
29 See Akerlof (1971).   
30 See OMB (2003, p. 5516). 
31 See OMB (2003, p. 5516). 
32 See OMB (1996, Section II.6). 
33 See OMB (1996, Section II.6).                     10 
Of course another possible interpretation of NHTSA’s economic analysis is that it 
contains errors.  
2.  NHTSA’s measures of net benefits are too optimistic. 
NHTSA uses measures of social cost that are optimistic in three respects.  First, it 
uses engineering-based estimates that exclude the foregone value to the consumer of the 
declines in performance associated with better fuel economy.  NHTSA acknowledges 
“There is often a trade-off between performance and fuel economy”
34 and that “All 
[such] tradeoffs necessarily involve costs to the extent that reduced engine size or 
performance reduces the value of the vehicle to the consumer.”
35  But NHTSA “has not 
attempted to value these performance reductions,”
36 although it does “plan to do so in the 
event (and to the extent) that such tradeoffs will result from the final rule.”
37  NHTSA’s 
neglect of the value of performance reductions is one key reason that it has 
underestimated the costs and overestimated the net benefits of its proposal.  NHTSA 
should analyze the cost of forgone performance.    
Second, NHTSA may have underestimated how much consumers discount future 
fuel savings. While NHTSA estimated that the improved fuel economy will raise vehicle 
costs by only $47 per vehicle,
38 some buyers may be unable to borrow this much at the 7 
percent interest rate (net of inflation) assumed by NHTSA.
39  The Consumer Expenditure 
Survey indicates that annual interest rates from 1984-1995 were 10 percent on used cars 
                                                           
34 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section IV). 
35 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section IV). 
36 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section IV). 
37 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section IV). 
38 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Table VI-3).  
39 Although recent data indicate vehicle loan interest rates are currently less than 7 percent, we feel that 
current economic conditions do not represent expected future interest rates.                       11 
and 7.6 percent on new cars.
40   Using an interest rate of 10 percent to discount future fuel 
savings would reduce NHTSA’s calculated fuel savings by $15 per vehicle.   
There is some evidence that consumers use much higher discount rates in 
evaluating future energy savings.  Train (1985) cites evidence from national surveys 
suggesting consumers require rates of return as high as 26 and 32 percent before 
investing in improvements in thermal integrity of their homes.  The key rationale for such 
high discount rates is that investments in energy efficiency are irreversible and 
uncertain.
41   While we have no direct evidence about the appropriateness of these rates to 
vehicle fuel economy, we do note that the irreversibility and uncertainty associated with 
such investments suggests that consumers may impose rates of return significantly above 
more typical discount rates such as 7 or even 10 percent.  NHTSA should discount future 
fuel savings at the rate appropriate for vehicle buyers.   
Third, NHTSA’s analysis fails to address the possibility that manufacturers will 
use lighter, less crashworthy vehicles, saying simply “We believe that manufacturers will 
meet the proposed CAFE levels without any meaningful deviation from the planned 
performance and weight of their vehicles.”
42  Yet a recent National Research Council 
committee concluded:  “The downweighting and downsizing that occurred in the later 
1970s and early 1980s, some of which was due to CAFE standards, probably resulted in 
an additional 1,300 to 2,600 traffic fatalities in 1993.”
43  Although the NRC did not 
ascribe a particular portion of these deaths to CAFE, Crandall and Graham’s earlier 
analysis suggested that CAFE standards led to “several thousand additional fatalities over 
                                                           
40 These interest rates are net of inflation.  See Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou (2000).  Attanasio and 
co-authors find that credit constraints are binding for some groups in the population, particularly young and 
low-income households, but the implications of this finding for our purposes are complicated and unclear.   
41 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a discussion.                     12 
the life of each model-year’s cars.”
44  Similarly, Coate and VanderHoff found that the 
greater weight of light trucks were a significant cause of lower fatality rates in single-
vehicle accidents associated with light truck use.
45  In multiple vehicle accidents they 
found that the protective effects of light trucks to their occupants outweighed any 
increase in fatalities to occupants of other vehicles.
46  Their results indicate that increased 
use of light trucks prevented approximately 2,000 highway fatalities between 1994 and 
1997.
47   
Use of lighter materials is the only important fuel economy measure that NHTSA 
does not carefully analyze in its proposal.  NHTSA’s neglect of these costs (and vehicle 
buyers’ aversion to lighter vehicles) may help explain how it is able to conclude 
(wrongly) that the benefits to consumers of more stringent CAFE exceed the costs to 
producers.  NHTSA should include the possible use of lighter materials in its analysis of 
costs.  
Given the lack of credible estimates about the adverse effects of more stringent 
CAFE on manufacturers and consumers, it is useful to pursue an alternative analytical 
approach that sidesteps this issue entirely.  In the following section we ignore costs to 
producers associated with making vehicles more fuel-efficient and the benefits to 
consumers of greater fuel economy. Instead we focus only on the externalities of the 
proposed regulation.  This approach works provided we stick only to external benefits 
and costs and exclude those already internal to the decision-making of vehicle purchasers 
or manufacturers.  In particular we address whether the social costs of additional driving 
                                                                                                                                                                             
42 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section IV). 
43 See NAS (2002, p. 111).  Two committee members dissented.  
44 See Crandall and Graham (1989, p. 98).  
45 See Coate and VanderHoff (2001, p. 24).                      13 
resulting from the improved fuel economy are large relative to the social value of the fuel 
savings that the proposed standard might provide. 
3. Net social effects of NHTSA’s proposal are nil or even detrimental.  
NHTSA acknowledges that more stringent CAFE standards will reduce the cost 
of driving and thereby increase the annual miles driven per vehicle.
48  Further, its 
economic analysis concedes that the increased driving is likely to worsen congestion and 
traffic accidents.  Without any empirical justification, however, NHTSA simply asserts 
that the increases in the social costs associated with congestion and traffic accidents will 
be “slight.”
49 In fact, this effect appears sufficiently large to outweigh the social value of 
reduced gasoline consumption.    
Econometric studies suggest that a 10 percent reduction in the price of fuel 
increases miles driven by 1 percent to 3 percent.
50  The NRC and NHTSA used these 
estimates to infer that a 10 percent reduction in fuel cost attributable to mandatory fuel 
economy standards would increase miles driven in the range of 1 percent to 2 percent.
51  
The Congressional Budget Office recently stated that potential gasoline savings from a 
rise in fuel economy would probably be offset by increases in driving of about 2 
percent.
52   
Estimates of the social costs of additional vehicle miles traveled – especially 
increased traffic accidents and congestion – permit calculations of the social costs of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
46 See Coate and VanderHoff (2001, p. 24).  
47 See Coate and VanderHoff (2001, p. 24). 
48 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII). 
49 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII, endnote 4).  
50 See CBO (2002, Chapter 2, footnote 11), Greene (1992), Greene, et al, (1999), and Goldberg (1998). 
51 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII, endnote 5), and NAS (2002, p. 96).  
52 See CBO (2002, p. 19).  The different estimates between NHTSA and CBO appear to be more a result of 
differing emphasis and/or interpretation of surveyed studies and less a product of surveying different 
studies.                       14 
additional driving induced by the higher CAFE standard.  First note that the relative 
change in VMT, (that is, ∆VMT / VMT
0), can be calculated as the product of the 
percentage change in fuel costs per mile and the rebound effect:   
 (1)  ∆VMT / VMT





0 is the gallons per mile in the baseline, GMP
1 is the gallons per mile after the 
change in policy, and r is the elasticity of vehicle miles driven with respect to the cost of 
gasoline per mile.
53   
The proposed change in the CAFE standard from 20.7 to 22.2 mpg for MY 2007 
would increase the estimated fuel economy level for a representative MY 2007 light truck 
from 21.83 to 22.35 mpg as measured in laboratory tests.
54  Since NHTSA and NRC 
assume on-road fuel economy to be 85 percent of laboratory fuel economy, on-road miles 
per gallon will rise from 18.56 to 19.0 mpg, an increase in fuel economy of 2.3 percent.
55  
Assuming a rebound effect of -0.15, equation (1) implies an increase in VMT of 0.35 
percent.  For trucks that would have been driven 10,000 miles per year in the absence of a 
new CAFE standard, the increase in mileage, ∆VMT, would be about 35 miles per year.
56  
This increased mileage results from a CAFE standard that saves 10.6 gallons of 
gasoline.
57  If the rebound effect were -.2, annual mileage would increase by 46 miles and 
fuel savings would be 10.0 gallons.  
                                                           
53 This equation is consistent with NHTSA’s approach.  See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section 
VII). 
54 Estimated laboratory fuel economy levels exceed the standards since some manufacturers’ plans for 
future models already exceed the proposed baseline. 
55 [100 x (((1 / 19.00) – (1 / 18.56)) / (1 / 18.56)) =2.38].  EPA’s assumption of a 15 percent fuel economy 
“gap” may be understated given recent research.  The Department of Energy, for example, assumes a fuel 
economy gap of 24.5 percent for light trucks and large SUVs.  See Department of Energy (2000).  
56 As shown in Appendix C, the annual mileage that light trucks are driven is irrelevant for our conclusions; 
our assumption that mileage is 10,000 is solely for convenience.   




0 = 10035 x (1/19.00) – 10000 x (1/18.56) = 10.63.                     15 
To assess the external social costs of this increase in driving we focus on the cost 
of accidents and the cost of congestion.
58   
Extra driving boosts traffic accidents.  A key question is how much of these costs 
drivers take into account in their decisions about how and how much to drive.  Aaron 
Edlin of the University of California at Berkeley estimates the marginal cost of accidents 
to be about 8 cents per additional mile driven,
59 and the insured cost of accidents to be 
approximately 4 cents per mile driven. Edlin shows insurance premiums are (virtually) 
invariant with respect to miles driven, although the accident costs vary nearly 
proportionately with mileage.
60 Thus, in deciding how much to drive, drivers have no 
incentive to take into account the additional accident costs covered by insurance 
companies.   
Cliff Winston and Chad Shirley present a higher estimate of marginal accident 
costs – about 20 cents per mile in 2000 dollars – but suggest that the only cost that 
travelers do not bear are the delays they cause other travelers.
61  They do not distinguish, 
however, between drivers and other travelers (for example, those that may not be 
responsible for an accident).  They also do not address the lack of a direct relationship 
between miles driven and insurance premiums.  These estimates and others in the 
literature are summarized in Table 1.  
                                                           
58 NHTSA also considers the increased emissions of local air pollutants but finds these to be so small as to 
be negligible.  See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII).  Some analysts have suggested that 
we need also to consider the benefits of the increased driving induced by more fuel-efficient vehicles, but 
these are much too small to matter, as we show in Appendix E. 
59 See Edlin (1999, p. 4).  Costs are calculated in fiscal year 2000 dollars. 
60 Researchers have found that fatalities are positively related to vehicle miles traveled.  See Coate and 
VanderHoff (2001, p. 24).  
61 See Winston and Shirley (1998, p. 64.)                     16 
Table 1 
Accident Cost Estimates 












  National cost. (The insured cost of 4¢ per 
mile is external to decision to drive.) 
Levinson 
et al (1996) 
6.3¢  5.6¢  Costs estimated by combining an accident 
rate model with costs per accident.  
MacKenzie 
et al (1992) 











20¢    Analysis of the largest 116 urbanized 
areas (with pop. >200,000). 
 
Extra driving also exacerbates delays on crowded roads.  According to a 
commonly cited source, traffic delays cost Americans nearly $70 billion per year in lost 
time and extra fuel.
62  Researchers have estimated incremental congestion costs between 
a penny and a quarter per vehicle per mile in key U.S. cities and significantly more on 
important arteries.
63  To calculate congestion costs in urban areas, we use data from the 
Texas Transportation Institute (TTI).  Its 2002 Urban Mobility Report implies that the 
congestion cost among the 75 urban areas studied is about 15 cents per vehicle mile 
                                                           
62 Congestion costs for 2001—$78 billion—are in Table A-9, 2001 Urban Mobility Report, Texas 
Transportation Institute.  For 2002, an updated version of the same report gave only $67.5 billion due to a 
slightly different sample size, an improved speed estimating procedure, and the California recession, which 
lessened increased congestion.  The studies conclude that congestion is increasing.   
63 See, for example, Winston and Shirley (1998, p. 58).  California Environmental Protection Agency 
(1996, p. 6-14) reports values as high as $0.99 per mile on some peak corridors and as low as 12 to 30 cents 
per mile throughout the Bay Area morning peak (2000$).                       17 
traveled during workdays.
64  The average congestion cost per mile of vehicle use is a 
low-ball estimate of the marginal congestion cost of extra driving.  
Congestion costs may be lower because some research suggests that the disutility 
of congestion, that is, the hassle of traffic jams, is less than assumed by the 2002 Urban 
Mobility Report, which figures the cost of travelers’ time to be $12.85 per hour.
65 
Congestion costs may be lower than these estimates because people choose the location 
of home and work according to their willingness to put up with traffic jams.  In particular, 
Calfee and Winston estimate that the average willingness to pay to avoid an hour of 
congestion ranges from 14 to 26 percent of the gross hourly wage, with an average of 19 
percent.
66   In 1998, the average gross wage in 64 metropolitan areas was $33,381 per 
year, or about $16.70 per hour, assuming 2000 hours of work each year.
67  Using this 
estimate of the hourly wage, Calfee and Winston’s estimate of the willingness to pay to 
avoid congestion suggests that the per hour costs of congestion delays in the TTI sample 
should be about a fifth of $16.70, or $3.30.  This lower estimate of the value of time 
suggests the average congestion costs in the 2002 Urban Mobility Report would fall to 
about 5 cents per mile.
68 
To estimate the marginal costs of congestion, we use data from the Urban 
Mobility Report, which reports, in addition to congestion costs (delays and fuel), data on 
                                                           
64 To derive this, note that the total annual cost of congestion-related delays averaged across the 75 cities is 
900 million.  See Schrank and Lomax (2002, p. A-61). The total daily vehicle miles traveled on freeways, 
expressways and principal arteries is 24.6 million.  See Schrank and Lomax (2002, p. A-71).  Since the 
report assumes 250 working days per year, the average cost of congestion-related delays among these 75 
cities is $0.146 per mile: 900 / (24.6 x 250) = $.146 per mile. 
65 See Schrank and Lomax (2002, p.B-1). 
66 See Calfee and Winston (1988, p.91). 
67 See U.S. Census Bureau (2001, p.436). 
68 It is important to note that in the Urban Mobility Report congestion cost is composed of lost time and lost 
fuel.  Adjustments to the wage rate only affect the former.  Total congestion costs averaged $900 million in 
the 75 urban areas: $780 million delay cost and $120 million fuel cost.  [(780 x .25 + 120) / (24.6 x 250) = 
$.05 per mile].  See earlier footnote.                      18 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and lane miles available on freeways and principal arterial 
roads for select urban areas with populations over 100,000.  In particular, we consider 
data for the years 1994 though 2000 that TTI staff believes are most reliable.
69  After 
adjusting these data to be consistent with Calfee and Winston and also Winston and 
Shirley, we estimate marginal costs of congestion of about 23 cents in 2000.  We describe 
the derivation of these estimates in Appendix D.   
This estimate is high but close to the range of the published literature contained in 
Table 2, given the disparate geographic regions, peak periods being considered and 
methods.  Our estimate of 23 cents per mile is different from other results because it 
represents the increase in congestion costs during the peak period from an additional mile 
driven during the day.  Thus it may significantly understate the incremental congestion 
costs resulting from additional vehicle miles during the peak period.  Other studies have 
focused on this measure of incremental congestion costs.  
Our estimate is closest to Winston and Shirley’s finding of 26 cents per mile.  Our 
treatment of the value of reduced travel time is consistent with theirs. Their estimates of 
the value of travel time range from 8 to 49 percent of average hourly earnings depending 
on the length of the commute and whether it occurred during peak or off-peak periods, 
and they state that their findings appear to be consistent with those of Calfee and 
Winston.
70  Winston and Shirley examined the largest 116 urbanized areas—those with 
populations over 200,000, and found optimal tolls of 26 cents per mile for the most 
congested cities during peak periods, although some cities and times reach almost 60 
                                                           
69 We are grateful to David Schrank, who sent us a file for these data and advised us to choose these years.   
70 See Winston and Shirley (1998, p.38).                       19 
cents per mile.
71   Estimates from the TTI database should be lower because it includes 
smaller cities—75 urban areas with populations over 100,000—such as Boulder, 
Colorado and Brownsville, Texas.   They should be higher, however, because they 
represent the increase in peak congestion costs associated with an increase in driving at 
any time of the day.  In addition, they include the costs of commercial vehicle delays, 
which amount to about a fifth of the total congestion costs.
72  Finally, about 5 cents of 
this estimate reflects fuel costs, an item excluded from the other marginal cost estimates. 
To derive an estimate of nationally representative congestion costs, we make 
several adjustments.  The 2002 Urban Mobility Report studied areas with 50 percent of 
the U.S. population, but only 18 percent of national VMT occurred in the areas and days 
assessed by the Report.
73  Assuming conservatively that marginal congestion costs 
elsewhere and on non-business days are a fifth of those that we estimate using data from 
the Report, a marginal estimate of national congestion cost would be 8.0¢ per mile.   
These estimates and others from the published literature appear in Table 2.  
                                                           
71 In 2000 dollars.  See Winston and Shirley (1998, pp. 59-61). 
72 Private communication from David Schrank. 
73 The average population in year 2000 for the 75 urban areas studied in the 2002 Urban Mobility Report 
was 1,770,000, implying a total sample population of 132,750,000.  See Schrank and Lomax (2002, p. 55).  
According to the Census Bureau, United States civilian population was 273,936,000 in 2000.  See Census 
Bureau (2001, No. 1).  Total vehicle miles traveled in year 2000 for the 75 urban areas during the days and 
times used in the study were over 461 billion miles.  See Schrank and Lomax (2002, p. 71).  This figure is 
about 18 percent of total U.S. VMT in 2000, which was 2,523 billion miles.  See Department of 
Transportation (2001, Table VM-1).                       20 
Table 2 
Congestion Cost Estimates 








Bay Area morning 
peak = 12¢ 
As high as 99¢ on 
some main 
corridors in Calif. 
Examined congestion costs in 





12¢   Surveyed the 10 most populous urban 
areas in the mid-1990s; estimate 
assumes cost of traffic delays is 20 
percent of gross wage. 
Parry and 
Small  (2002, 
p.17) 
3.5¢  Marginal congestion cost averaged 




Avg. cost = 19¢
74  Estimated congestion costs for 68 
urban areas. Assumes cost of travelers’ 




Avg. cost= 15¢  Estimated congestion costs for 75 
urban areas. Assumes cost of travelers’ 






and times range 
from 1¢ to 59¢ 
For the most congested cities during 
peak travel times.  Analysis was 
performed for the largest 116 urbanized 
areas (those with pop. >200,000).  
*Note: costs per mile are optimal tolls, except for the Schrank and Lomax estimates.   
 
To estimate the additional societal cost  (∆S) from the additional driving we use 
 
 (2)  ∆S = ∆VMT x (accident costs + congestion costs)   
 
Given the range of uncertainty in congestion and accident costs, we assume first 
that the marginal costs of accidents and congestion are 3¢ and 8¢ per mile, respectively.  
                                                           
74 The 2001 Urban Mobility Report found total congestion costs to be $77,790 million and total annual 
VMT of 433,160 million miles (assuming 250 working days) for the 68 urban areas.  This works out to an 
average congestion cost of 17.96¢ in 1999 (18.56¢ in 2000 dollars).  See Schrank and Lomax (2001, pp. 
44-52).                     21 
In this case ∆S would be $3.85 for a vehicle driven 10,000 miles.
75  Since the 
improvement in fuel economy would save about 10.6 gallons for the year, the social cost 
of the extra driving is 36¢ per gallon of gasoline saved.
76  With lower estimates, say 2¢ 
and 6¢ respectively, the social cost of the extra driving is about 26¢ per gallon of gas 
saved.  In a recent study Parry and Small report marginal congestion cost averaged across 
the United States to be 3.5¢ per mile, and external accident costs to be 3¢ per mile.
77  
Given their rebound effect of -.22,
78 the social cost per gallon saved is 34¢.  Thus, we 
estimate that the external social costs from the additional driving induced by NHTSA’s 
proposal to range from 26¢ to 36¢ per gallon.   
To judge whether these are high or low requires an assessment of the social value 
of saving fuel.  Both NHTSA and NRC have provided estimates, which appear in Table 
3. 
                                                           
75 $3.85= 35 miles (3¢ + 8¢). 
76 $.36 per gallon = 3.85 / 10.6.  
77 See Parry and Small (2002, pp. 17-19).   
78 See Parry and Small (2002, p. 20).                     22 
 
Table 3 
Estimates of the Social Benefits of Reducing Gasoline Consumption  
(cents per gallon) 
 NHTSA  NRC Comments 
Lower world oil prices   4.8¢  NHTSA and NRC both 
believe U.S. influence over 
oil price is small or limited.
79 
Reduced risk of oil 




NRC estimate represents 
combined effects of the 
monopsony, supply and 
security components. 
Reduced environmental 
damages from refinery 
and distribution 
emissions 
Emission of “some 
pollutants may 







NHTSA presented no 
quantitative estimate 





12¢  According to NRC, “This 
figure is significantly higher 
than typical estimates.”
82 
Total   8.3¢  26¢   
 
   According to NHTSA, the value of externalities per gallon of gasoline is 8.3¢, of 
which 4.8¢ represents savings because reduced U.S. demand lowers world oil prices.  
Another 3.5¢ is for the decreased exposure to oil supply disruptions.  Our estimates of 
external social costs from more driving, 26¢ to 36¢ per gallon, are much greater than 
NHTSA’s estimate of the value of fuel saving.   
Considering a different set of effects than those quantified by NHTSA, the NRC 
arrives at a societal benefit of 26¢ per gallon saved.  The social costs of the additional 
                                                           
79 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII) and NAS (2002, p. 86). 
80 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII). 
81 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII, Environmental Costs of Oil Refining and 
Consumption).                       23 
driving are as large or larger than this estimate, which includes an estimate of the benefits 
of controlling greenhouse gas emissions that the NRC describes as “high.”   
  The social cost of the additional driving induced by more fuel-efficient vehicles 
thus fully offsets and probably outweighs the societal benefit of saving fuel.  Importantly, 
this result holds for any level of driving, as shown in Appendix C.  Thus, taking into 
account the external benefits and the most significant external costs of NHTSA’s 
proposal – including global warming, disruptions to U.S. oil supply, traffic accidents, and 
congestion – the proposed CAFE revision provides no net benefits and is in fact likely to 
have detrimental effects.   
Policy Choice 
NHTSA’s proposed rule is inconsistent with Executive Order 12866 on 
Regulatory Planning and Review.  The 1993 E.O. stipulates that  
Each agency shall tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society, 
including individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and other entities (including 
small communities and governmental entities), consistent with obtaining the 
regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other things and to the extent 
practicable, the cumulative costs of regulations.
83   
 
Since NHTSA is justifying its proposal by an alleged inefficiency in vehicle 
markets, rather than concerns about the environment, or dependence on foreign oil, it 
needs to consider the plain implications of its view.  A regulation mandating greater 
information disclosure would surely be less burdensome than one requiring more fuel-
efficient vehicles.  Printing more detailed fuel economy labels and allowing consumers to 
choose what vehicles to drive would be less expensive than mandating a fuel economy 
standard.  Even a gasoline tax, by reducing instead of increasing driving and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
82 See NAS (2002, p. 85). 
83 See Clinton (1993, Section 1(b)(11)).                       24 
associated traffic accidents and congestion, is likely to reduce gasoline use at lower social 
cost than CAFE.  To comply with E.O. 12866, NHTSA should consider proposing better 
fuel economy labels, and, if it seeks greater reductions in gasoline use, a modest gas tax.   
Conclusion 
  To conserve gasoline, the National Highway Transportation Safety 
Administration recently proposed to increase the stringency of corporate average fuel 
economy standards for light trucks by 1.5 miles per gallon for model year 2007.  While 
the proposal does not seem very stringent, in fact it is the biggest increase since the early 
1980s.  More importantly, it is a very inefficient way of achieving the stated regulatory 
goal of reducing fuel use. 
  To defend its proposal, NHTSA points to the fuel savings that consumers would 
experience as a result of more stringent CAFE, claiming this benefit alone outweighs 
costs to producers.  This argument presumes that vehicle manufacturers interested in 
making money are unable to build vehicles that consumers are willing and able to pay 
for, even though they could profit by doing so.  This presumption – which is unsupported 
by any direct evidence – is the cornerstone of NHTSA’s proposal.   
NHTSA reached its conclusions that consumer benefits outweigh costs to vehicle 
manufacturers by using an analytic approach that overstates benefits to consumers and 
understates costs to manufacturers.  If NHTSA’s analysis were correct it would mean– 
according to OMB’s own guidelines – that NHTSA should prefer regulations that give 
consumers better information about fuel economy, an approach that NHTSA has not even 
considered.                      25 
   While NHTSA’s proposal will reduce gasoline consumption, it will also increase 
driving.  The social costs of the increased driving – accidents and traffic jams – will fully 
offset the social benefits of reduced fuel consumption and will probably outweigh them.   
If NHTSA is interested in a cost-effective way of reducing gasoline use, it should 
consider improving the fuel economy stickers on new vehicles to give consumers more 
information.  It could also suggest a modest gasoline tax, which would provide incentives 
to all drivers to conserve fuel—the purported goal of NHTSA’s proposal.  Indeed, a tax 
of a penny per gallon effective in 2007 would reduce gasoline use by about as much as 
NHTSA’s proposed standard
84—while reducing instead of increasing driving and the 
associated risks.   
                                                           
84 See Appendix A.                      26 
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Appendix A 
The Effect of a Modest Gasoline Tax on Fuel Consumption 
  A very modest gasoline tax is as effective in reducing gasoline consumption as 
NHTSA’s proposed CAFE standard.  A tax of 1 cent–per-gallon of gasoline would save 
as much fuel as the NHTSA proposal in 2007; a mere 3 cents would save almost 150 
million additional gallons in 2010.  The effectiveness of a gasoline tax results from its 
applicability to all vehicles, not just new light trucks.  The gallons saved from the change 
in price are: 






0 equals the total gallons of gasoline consumed by motor vehicles in a given year, 
r equals the rebound effect, P
0 is the initial price of a gallon of gasoline, and P
1 is the 
price per gallon with the added tax.  Thus, P
1-P
0 represents the amount of the tax per 
gallon.  
  To show the effects of a modest gasoline tax in 2007, we use Department of 
Energy forecasts of the Annual Energy Outlook 2003 with Projections to 2025 (AEO 
2003).
85  T h e  AEO 2003 estimates motor vehicle energy consumption to be 18.59 
quadrillion British Thermal Units (Btu) in 2007.
86  Given that one quadrillion Btu is 
equivalent to 7.75 billion gallons of motor gasoline,
87 fuel consumption by motor 
vehicles is 144 billion gallons.  The AEO 2003 forecasts gasoline to cost  $1.41 per gallon 
in 2007.
88 Assuming a long-run rebound effect of -.2 and a gasoline tax of just 1 penny 
                                                           
85 See U.S. Department of Energy (2003).    
86 See U.S. Department of Energy (2003, Table 2). 
87 See U.S. Department of Transportation (2002d, Human and Natural Environment, p. 3). 
88 See U.S. Department of Energy (2003, Table 12).  Although this estimate is slightly lower than the 
NHTSA forecast, we adopt it here to ensure internal consistency in our calculations.                     32 
per gallon, equation (1) yields decreased motor vehicle fuel consumption of 200 million 
gallons.
89   
  The total gallons saved in a given year under the NHTSA proposal is the sum of 
the gallons saved by each affected model year during the year in question.  The gallons 
saved for a model year, i, in a given year are: 





where LTSi is the light truck sales projection, VMTi
0 and GPM
0 are the vehicle miles 
traveled and the gallons per mile before the tightened standard, and VMTi
1 and GPM
1 are 
the vehicle miles traveled and the gallons per mile after the CAFE increase.   
  NHTSA projects light truck sales to be 7.65 million vehicles in 2005, 7.80 million 
in 2006, and 7.92 million in 2007.
90  NHTSA further estimates vehicle miles traveled to 
be 12,885 miles in the first year of a vehicle’s life, 12,444 miles in the second, and 
12,007 in the third.
91  NHTSA’s CAFE proposal would increase on-road fuel economy 
for MY 2005 light trucks from 18.03 to 18.15 mpg, from 18.27 to 18.55 mpg for MY 
2006 light trucks, and from 18.56 to 19.00 mpg for MY 2007.
92   Tightened CAFE 
standards increase VMT according to:  
 (3)  VMTi
1 = VMTi




Employing a rebound effect of -.15, in 2007 NHTSA’s proposal would lead to VMT of 
12,019 for MY 2005 (in their third year), 12,472 for MY 2006 (in their second year), and 
12,930 for MY 2007 (in their first year).  Given model year fuel savings derived in 
                                                           
89 The change in fuel demand is 144,072,500,000 (-.2) (.01/1.41).  We use -.2, because it is a better estimate 
of the long-run response to changes in fuel prices than -.15.   
90 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII). 
91 See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII). 
92 Note that on-road fuel economy is estimated as 85 percent of laboratory fuel economy.  See Department 
of Transportation (2002a, Section VII).                       33 
equation (2), the NHTSA proposal results in total fuel savings of approximately 200 
million gallons in 2007, about equal to the 1 cent-per-gallon tax.   
  We repeated this analysis in 2010 to derive the effects of a 3 cents-per-gallon tax 
using predicted motor gasoline consumption of 156 billion gallons at a price of $1.43 per 
gallon.
93  A tax of 3 cents per gallon of gasoline would reduce consumption by 650 
million gallons.  The NHTSA proposal would save only 500 million gallons in 2010.
94   
  One could calculate the tax burden associated with this idea, however, 
comparisons of it with the costs of CAFE are premature until NHTSA presents estimates 
of the full costs to producers and consumers of its proposal.   
                                                           
93 See U.S. Department of Energy (2003, Tables 2 and 12).  
94 We used a linear regression of the logs of sales projections to estimate light truck sales for MY’s 2008-
2010.  We assumed that on-road fuel economy would remain at 19.00 mpg in these years.  See Department 
of Transportation (2002a, Section VII).                       34 
Appendix B 






Note “Estimated Annual Fuel Cost.” 





                                                           
95 See 40 CFR § 600.Appendix.                     35 
Appendix C 
Irrelevance of Annual Mileage 
  While we have assumed for simplicity of presentation that all new light trucks 
would be driven 10,000 miles per year, our analysis and conclusions are completely 
independent of this assumption.  In particular, the social cost per gallon saved is 
independent of initial miles driven, because both the social cost from additional driving 
and the gallons saved are proportional to the initial miles driven.  To see this, first note 
that 
(1)  ∆VMT / VMT




which implies  




0), and  
(3) VMT
1 = VMT






0 + ∆VMT.  Given a social cost, s, associated with an additional 
mile of driving, the total social cost from the extra driving is simply  
(4) s∆VMT = s VMT




The gallons saved from more fuel-efficient standards can be computed as  
(5) ) GPM VMT ( ) GPM VMT ( G
1 1 o o − = ∆ , 
or using (3) 
(6)  )] GPM )
GPM
) GPM GPM ( r





+ − = ∆  
Thus, social cost per gallon saved (s∆VMT / ∆G), is independent of initial miles driven 
since both (4) and (6) are proportional to VMT
0.                       36 
Appendix D 
Incremental Congestion Costs In Urban Areas With Populations 
Greater Than 100,000 
  We received, courtesy of David Schrank of the Texas Transportation Institute, 
data on the congestion costs, vehicle miles traveled and lane miles of freeways, and 
principal and arterial roads for 75 U.S. cities for the years 1994 to 2000.  TTI staff 
suggested that these 525 observations were the ones most likely to be fully comparable 
over time and space. Summary statistics for these data appear below.  
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev Min  Max 
Year 525  1997 2.00197  1999 2000 
Cost (2000$)  525  7.48 x 10
8  1.74 x 10
9  0  1.46 x 10
9 
VMT  525  5.75 x 10
9  7.58 x 10
9  1.90 x 10
8  4.97 x 10
10 
Lane  Miles  525  2305.8 2633.9 140  16350 
 
Cost is the sum of congestion costs, that is, both fuel and traveler time.  VMT denotes 
vehicle miles traveled, in miles.   
  Inspection of the cost data revealed that it was fairly highly skewed, with 26 
observations with no reported congestion costs.  The 5
th percentile cost was $5,000,000, 
the 10
th was $2.0 x 10
7, and the 90
th was $1.64 x 10
9. 
Further examination of these data suggest that they are lumpy, in that city-years 
with congestion costs less than or equal to $10 million consist of the 26 observations of 
zero, 7 observations with congestion costs of $5 million, and 14 observations with 
congestion costs of $10 million.    
To make these data consistent with the results of Calfee and Winston (1998) and 
Winston and Shirley (1998) we adjust these cost estimates.  In particular, for each year, 
we adjust total cost to equal  
(.12) total cost  + (.88) total cost (x)                     37 
where x, the ratio of 19 percent of gross wages in selected major cities to the time cost of 
travel used in the TTI study, varies from .24 to .27 among the different years.
96   
The Cook-Weisberg test indicates substantial heteroskedasticity in the errors of a 
fixed effect regression of congestion costs on VMT, lane miles and dummy variables for 
years. The chi-squared statistic for this test is statistically significant at better than the 0.1 
percent level.   
A linear OLS fixed effects regression of total cost on vehicle miles traveled and 
total lane miles suggests marginal costs of 18 cents.  
A nonlinear Box-Cox regression procedure yields
97  
Variable  Value   Std. Error  Z  P>|z|       [95% C.I.] 
Lambda  .4338 .03164  13.71 0.00  .3719-.4959 
Theta .2377 .01366  17.40 0.00  .2109-.2645 
 
Lambda and theta are the Box-Cox transformations for VMT and congestion cost, 
respectively. The confidence intervals suggest that the data reject both linear and 
logarithmic models.  In this model the coefficient on the transformed VMT, which is 
statistically significant at better than the 99 percent confidence level, is .01706. These 
data imply that the marginal cost of an additional mile of driving is $.23.
98   
                                                           
96 The TTI data set use McFarland and Chui’s (1987) value of travel time of $8.03 in 1985 adjusted to the 
appropriate year.  See Schrank and Lomax (2002, Appendix B, p.1).  The Statistical Abstract of the United 
States reports average annual pay by select metropolitan areas for the years in question in the Labor Force, 
Employment, and Earnings section.  See U.S. Census Bureau (Average Annual Pay by Selected 
Metropolitan Area).  These 71 metropolitan areas are not the same as the 75 cities in the TTI dataset.  The 
TTI values range from 69 to 79 percent of the average annual pay, assuming 2000 working hours per year, 
and correspond to values of x between .27 and .24.  
97 The Box-Cox transformation requires strictly positive values, so we experiment with replacing the 
congestion costs reported to be zero with congestion values of $1 million and $2.5 million.  We find that 
the marginal cost estimate is little affected by these assumptions.  David Schrank confirms that the 
estimates of congestion costs close to zero involve significant rounding so these alternatives to zero 
congestion costs appear reasonable.   
98 The STATA 7.0 software that we used for this regression does not compute standard errors for non-linear 
functions of the relevant parameters, so we do not have a confidence interval for this estimate, although 
each of the relevant parameters is statistically significant at better than the 99 percent confidence level.                      38 
  Although the model rejects a logarithmic transformation, we note that the log 
model implies a marginal cost of 16¢ to 17¢ (depending on whether the zeros are rounded 
to $2.5 million of $1 million before our adjustments) with a 95 percent confidence 
interval of 14¢ to 18¢ for the former case, and 14¢ to 18¢ for the latter.   
  We also estimate this regression after subtracting the fuel costs of congestion.  In 
this case we find that the marginal delay costs are 18¢ per mile, suggesting that the fuel 
costs of congestion rise by 5¢ with every additional vehicle mile traveled.  
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Appendix E 
The Benefits of Additional Driving From Mandated Fuel  
Efficiency are Small
99 
  While consumers find that additional driving induced by greater fuel economy has 
value, this benefit is too small to matter for our analysis.  To show this, it is useful to 
distinguish between two different scenarios.  First, more stringent CAFE standards may 
induce a consumer to buy a different vehicle.  But, the consumer’s utility of purchasing 
and operating one vehicle versus another is already subsumed in the demand curves for 
new vehicles. Thus, there is no reason in this scenario to account (in welfare terms) for 
the increase in miles driven. 
  Second, with more stringent CAFE standards a consumer may continue to buy the 
same vehicle he would have bought without the standards.  In this scenario, there is an 
added consumer surplus to driving more miles, but it is so small as to be negligible.  To 













Given that the price of driving is initially P0, the consumer will choose to drive 
M0 miles.  If more stringent CAFE standards lower the price of driving to P1, driving 
                                                           
99 Thanks go to Andrew Kleit for help with this appendix.  
Miles Driven 







A                    40 
increases to M1.  The consumer gains are the rectangle A plus the familiar triangle, which 
we call B. The area A is what NHTSA refers to as the benefit of CAFE standards.   
  It is straightforward to show that the triangle B is small in relation to the area A.  
The area A is M0(P0-P1).  The area of B is ½  (M1-M0)(P0-P1).  Thus, the ratio of B to A is 
simply ½ (M1-M0)/M0. 
  To calculate this ratio, we have to solve for M1-M0 in term of M0.  Let ∆M=M1-
M0.   We have already discussed the “rebound effect,” r, which is the elasticity of miles 
driven with respect to fuel economy.  Thus we estimate (M1-M0)/M0 using 
(1) (M1-M0)/ M0  = r   ((GPM
1 – GPM
0) / GPM
0)   
where GPM
1 and GPM
0 are the gallons per mile under the current and the proposed 
CAFE standards.  
The proposed change in the CAFE standard from 20.7 to 22.2 mpg for MY 2007 
will increase the estimated on-road fuel economy level for a representative MY 2007 
light truck from 18.56 to 19.00 mpg, an increase in fuel economy (measured in gallons 
per mile) of 2.3 percent.
100  Assuming a rebound effect of -0.15, the increase in VMT is 
0.35 percent.  The ratio of the area B to the rectangle A is about .17 percent.   
The consumer surplus benefits of additional driving are also too small to matter 
for our conclusion that the social costs of additional driving are large relative to the value 
of the gallons saved.  The consumer surplus per mile over the range from M0-M1 can be 
calculated as one half of the difference in the price of driving, P0-P1.  Using NHTSA’s 
assumed price of gasoline ($1.50/gallon), P0-P1 = $1.50   (GPM
1 – GPM
0), so the average 
                                                           
100 These estimates are 85 percent of the MPG that NHTSA expects the new fleet to deliver in laboratory 
settings.  See Department of Transportation (2002a, Section VII) for a discussion of its projections of MPG 
of the new fleet and see Department of Transportation (2002b, Appendix A) for the difference between 
laboratory and on-road performance.                      41 
consumer surplus per mile is about 0.08¢ = (½)($1.50) (.00107).  This consumer surplus, 
which applies only to the households that did not change their choice of vehicle as a 
result of the more stringent fuel economy standards, is inconsequential.  